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Are values more than measures of our needs and desires or internalized social and cultural rules of 
behaviour, originating in cultures and devoid of any universally accessible objectivity? Is there a place 
for values in a world of facts? If so, how can values preserve their ideality and normativity? If not, how 
can value judgements be true or false? Max Scheler’s Material Axiology is the best answer Classical 
Phenomenology provides to this dilemma. Yet Material Axiology, in particular material ethics of values, 
is largely ignored or looked down upon for being based on unclear presuppositions. This paper tries to 
provide a fresh start by clarifying the bottom-up approach characteristic of phenomenology with an 
exercise in experimental phenomenology in which I will analyse the actual experience of certain aesthetic 
values in emotionally qualified perception.
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THE PARADOX OF AXIOLOGY
What is the Paradox of Axiology? 
There is a puzzle about the very nature of values that makes the possibility of their existence 
seem paradoxical. It rests on an apparent opposition between values and reality, an opposition 
or contrast which philosophy has always registered. For example, it is at the root of Plato’s 
characterization of Goodness as “beyond substance”, as well as of Hume’s dichotomy of facts 
and values and of the Naturalistic Fallacy that Moore cautions against. Even Kant’s purely 
deontological foundation of ethics is best understood as a response to the Paradox of Axiology. 
The Paradox of Axiology has been rephrased, in contemporary metaethics, as the Dilemma 
of Metaethics, that is a dilemma concerning the status of value properties. If they were real 
or natural properties, they would seem to lose their essentially normative character. But, if 
that’s so, then in order to preserve their normative character they would have to be creatures 
of another world. The presently available metaethical accounts of value purport to offer 
solutions to this dilemma.
The Paradox of Axiology is a serious one, albeit a “paradox” only in the weak sense of being 
something “beyond common opinion”. Yet, it teaches us a lot about the very nature of 
values. Moreover, it calls our attention to something that is in fact part of the “whatness” 
of values as they are experienced. The Paradox existed long before its technical metaethical 
conceptualization was introduced. It is constantly “lived” as an tension between the ideal and 
the real. Ideality is an essential feature of values. It is also a paradoxical one, for positive values are 
never as vividly given as they are in the painful recognition of their absence on earth, when 
the corresponding goods are missing, which most of the time (but not necessarily) means 
that the corresponding negative values are realized in their place. Through real injustice we 
come to see what justice is, and that what a just society is, is what most actual societies are not. 
The content of justice is exemplified by what societies could be and ought to be like, or by ideal 
societies.
One of the most popular strategies for explaining this Paradox away is to remove from value 
terms their value content, or matter. I call the result of this move the No-Matter-of-Value 
Thesis. We shall explore it further below. 




I shall argue for following claims:
C1. The No-Matter-of-Value Thesis makes the Paradox of Axiology unsolvable.
C2. Experimental Phenomenology1 shows that the No-Matter-of-Value Thesis is false.
C3. Experimental Phenomenology provides a foundation to Material Axiology2.
Most past and present conceptualizations of the Paradox are astoundingly silent about value 
experience and the life world, that is, about what appears to be the source of ordinary talk on 
value. So, in most cases, the data needed for any theory of value aiming to solve the Paradox 
are simply ignored.
In the contemporary debate on metaethics the problem is structural. For it depends on a 
methodological feature apparently inherited from the meta-linguistic origins of metaethics, 
namely, the exclusive focus on terms and concepts, as opposed to the corresponding non-
conceptual contents or data. The second-order level of metaethical discussions induces 
authors to address the “nature” or the “status” of value properties in general, most of the time, 
without any intuitive exhibition and analysis of their instances. I’ll call this way of arguing at a 
conceptual level only, without regard for phenomenal contents, a top-down strategy.
Much gets lost, though, concerning the very nature of values when the fact that they are 
qualities that can be experienced independently of their explicit conceptualization is ignored. 
Take ferocity. Infants may be frightened by the ferocious look of a warrior’s mask, yet without 
having at their disposal the concepts of ferocity and of mask. This says something about the 
nature of values. 
Ferocity is a typically “thick” value term. Now, the whole metaethical debate hinges on finding 
a satisfactory solution to the fact-value dichotomy, whether it is understood in Humean or 
Moorean terms. But this dichotomy, as is well known, faces apparent counterexamples in so 
called “thick” value-terms, or value concepts. 
Such terms as “ferocious”, “courageous”, and “cruel” – or, for that matter, “graceful” or 
“vigorous” – denote “thick” concepts, or concepts provided with descriptive content, as opposed 
to “thin” terms such as “right” or “good” which only seem to express normativity apart from 
any descriptive content.
Thick concepts would appear to escape the dichotomy. Edmund Husserl discussed this issue at 
the very beginning of the last century3, long before it became a matter of controversy in the 
Fifties between Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch on one side, and Richard Hare on the other4.
1 Albertazzi (2013), Husserl (1970a), pp. 203-209.
2 Scheler (1973).
3 Husserl (1970), Vol I, §§14-16; Hans Kelsen dismissed Husserl’s rejection of the dichotomy – much too hastily, I think 
- in his Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (1979), cf. Kelsen (1996).
4 Philippa Foot argues against the arbitrariness attached to the usage of “prescriptive” or “action guiding” words 
such as the names of virtues, or of words like “danger” or “pride” in case there where there is no “internal relation” 
between “commending” or evaluating and the non-evaluative meaning of these words (Foot 1978, pp. 83-104, the 
text was originally a paper delivered at Bedford University in 1958). Iris Murdoch opens up a much wider horizon in 
her criticism of “voluntarism” in value theory, targeting both (Sartrean) existential philosophy, with its reject of any 
rational justification of choices, as well as “linguistic” or Oxford moral philosophy, with its prescriptivism rejecting 
experience, research into the moral meaning of facts, learning, and discouraging of what Murdoch calls attention, 
which she explains thus: “I have used the word ‘attention’, which I borrow from Simone Weil, to express the idea of 
a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” (Murdoch 1970 p. 33). As for Richard Hare, while his book 
on The Language of Morals (1952) reinforces Hume’s dichotomy as a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
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Thick value terms can be used to challenge Hume’s claim that one cannot derive an Ought from 
an Is. If, for example, being courageous is a professional quality of a warrior, then a warrior 
ought to be courageous. Or, put in terms of truth makers, there is a quality rich in descriptive 
content – courage – which makes an Is value statement true or false. That quality is the 
referent of such expressions as “Jack is courageous” (which is contingently true or false), and 
“An ideal warrior is courageous” (which is a necessary truth).
The standard move suggested by a top-down approach is to split a thick concept into two 
parts, i.e., a descriptive content and a normative operator, where the descriptive content is 
and has to be a purely “factual” or “natural” content. This was the move first made by Kelsen 
(in response to Husserl) and by Richard Hare (in response to Philippa Foot).
Bernard Williams approvingly sums up this move in a very clear way:
The clearest account, as so often, is given by Hare: a term of this kind involves a 
descriptive complex to which a prescription has been attached, expressive of the values 
of the individual or of the society. … It is essential to this account that the specific or 
‘thick’ character of these terms is given in the descriptive element. The value part is 
expressed, under analysis, by the all-purpose prescriptive term ought5.
On this account, value concepts have no axiological contents. Either they are thin, and 
just prescriptions, or they are thick, and all the content they have is factual. Let’s call this 
statement the No-Matter-of-Value Thesis.
This thesis is, in fact, a consequence of Moore’s thesis of irreducibility, plus Moore’s claim that 
value concepts are non-analyzable. No matter how a thick value concept is analyzed in factual 
terms, there will be a residual value – such as the goodness of being courageous – that resists 
analysis in non-axiological terms. Otherwise, you run afoul of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Now, this thesis is false. The rest of this paper is devoted to arguing against this very popular 
mistake, which I take to be caused by the kind of value blindness that goes along with a top-
down approach.
Suppose you can analyse a thick value term in the way just suggested. So, a ferocious 
expression expresses preparedness to behave in a ferocious way, and a ferocious behaviour is 
such and such a behaviour, e.g., a fierce, wild, violent one. This, of course, sets us on the path 
of an infinite regress, for here ferocity is analysed in terms of other value qualities.
Suppose, then, that ferocity just “supervenes” on a class of animal behaviours which can be 
described in purely “factual”, say, “natural” terms, or that the predicate “is ferocious” can be 
analysed in terms of those animal behaviours plus an “all-purpose prescriptive (negative) term 
ought”. Now, is there any factual or natural property shared by these animal behaviours and, 
say, a ferocious joke, a ferocious ideology, a ferocious question? Is there any natural property 
common to elegant things, such as an elegant dress, an elegant apartment, an elegant gait, or a 
piece of elegant prose? It does not seem that we can find one.
And yet, we are usually able to tell ferocious or elegant things from those which are not. How 
is that possible? An obvious answer is that we do so by employing the concept of ferocity. 
But if the preceding argument is valid, then this concept is not analyzable in terms of factual 
contents plus a prescriptive operator. So, the real question is: What is the source of this 
concept? Given that it cannot be a given matter of fact, should we not then take it to be a given 
Thinking with the two-components theory (see below and footnote 5). 
5 Williams (1985), p. 130. This is the so-called Two Components Theory. (Putnam 2004, p. 41).





matter of value, as it were? Perhaps its source is, in other words, a non-conceptual or pre-
conceptual axiological content or datum. Should we not then consider, at least as a hypothesis, 
that what a thick concept may more or less aptly capture is the content of a given value as such, 
its ideal and normative “matter”, which we have, so to speak, in front of us and “consult”?
Now, this kind of data or given non-conceptual contents is exactly what a top-down approach 
to value is blind to. 
Our first move, then, is to make explicit the methodological rule of phenomenology as a 
bottom-up approach (in value theory but not in that alone):
(Meth): No theoretical problem about a type of thing S should be addressed without 
recourse to the intuitive presence of some token or instance, s, of S.
(Meth) is just an application of phenomenology’s primary charge, “Back to the things 
themselves”, or the principle of the priority of the given over conceptual construction. (Meth) is the 
means by which the oft-neglected world of everyday experience becomes again the privileged 
object of philosophical inquiry.
Our bottom-up approach can be introduced with a simpler type of case, the sort in which 
perception of value is in some sense “added to” perception in the most literal sense, i.e., 
sensory perception. We shall start with some examples of a type of quality that tradition 
recognizes as being “given to perception”, in aesthesis, that is, aesthetic qualities.
Claim 3 needs the support of experimental argumentation. To that end, some images will be 
shown that exemplify ferocity as a non-conceptual content or a value quality. Experimental 
Phenomenology will help us analyze this quality in terms of a typically tertiary quality, or 
quality of demand. This quality of demand is a global feature of perceptual configurations, 
constraining possible (co)variations of their contents, in all possible worlds in which ferocity 
is instantiated. Such a global quality is there, given in experience, as a matter of value. Its 
normative power, far from being “lost in description” – as if in principle descriptive language 
could not convey ideality – pertains to the qualified object essentially, or in all possible worlds 
in which it exists. 
Material axiology is a generalization of this discovery, according to which value terms do have 
a descriptive axiological content, and a very rich one, which can be analysed by reference to 
objects’ axiological qualities.
Here, in Figure 1, is an example readily available on the internet of a ferocious expression. 
Many things are apparently ferocious, and yet it is quite difficult to find a “natural” or 
“factual” property that might be shared by everything that has a ferocious appearance, 
ranging from a warrior’s mask, certain animal behaviours, or a scene of Artaud’s cruelty 
theatre, to an ideology, or even some jokes. But we rightly distinguish beautiful from ugly 
things, cruelty from mildness. The mask depicted in Figure 1 could not possibly be deemed 
mild or elegant. 
How can we identify cruelty and ferocity? By the concept cruel? But there is evidently no 
factual property shared by cruel jokes and, say, cruel meals! 
 Yet, as Iris Murdoch argues at length, it is always possible to improve one’s understanding of 
thick value concepts, such as impudence or courage. How is that possible, given what I’ve just 
said? 
If we try to resolve the problem by appealing to the mask’s ferocious appearance, a natural 
answer would be that there is in its appearance a matter to be looked at – and felt. A matter 
5. Back to the 
things themselves. 
The bottom-
up approach of 
Experimental 
Phenomenology
6. Some images 
121
THE PARADOX OF AXIOLOGY
of value, though, rather than a matter of fact. I’ve chosen a mask deliberately, for a mask 
is a means of make believe. When wearing such a mask, one can appear ferocious without 
having to be ferocious – regardless of the purpose this disguise may serve, whether it is ritual, 
theatrical, or a matter of carnival farce. A mask is an object under epochè, like any aesthetical 
object. It presents us with a quality which might be instanced in reality – the ferocious 
expression of an actual warrior – but which we grasp, so to speak, in the “abstract”, divorced 
from any genuine exercise of ferocity. 
Figure 1
Let’s briefly practice “contemplation,” or, in Murdoch’s terms, the improvement of our 
insightful understanding of ferociousness. We certainly have a lot of matter to conceptualize, 
matter that is first given to visual-cum-emotional perception. We are “struck” by more and 
more features, which we may or may not be able to adequately capture in words (not just 
any word will do!). We detect a quality of wildness or savageness which suggests, despite the 
evident shape and aspect of a human face, a lack of humanity. We sense hostility, aggressiveness, 
rapaciousness and greed. We are scared by the face’s fury (seen in the eyes) and apparent 
mordacity (visible in the teeth). The grim look of the mask exhibits a power of tearing apart and 
destroying in its sharp and pointed features…
This description serves as a counterexample to the idea that value terms are just action-
guiding terms. When I describe this mask as “ferocious” I am not warning you against any 
menace to your life or integrity, nor am I prescribing you to avoid encounters with it, etc. The 
point also works as a counterexample both to Hare’s prescriptivism and to emotivism. For the 
very same quality might be manifested in an act of cruelty, too. You would no doubt be right 
to fear being killed. And, were that to actually happen, it would be awkward if we then had to 
choose between either (a) admitting that “It was a cruel, a ferocious act” is a value judgment 
while denying the judgment a truth value or (b) admitting that the judgment corresponds 
to the pertinent facts while denying it the status of a value judgment. That awkwardness 
indicates, as is usually the case with thick terms, the untenability of the fact/value distinction. 
So, here a Two-Component Theory à la Hare (ascribing the judgment a descriptive content 
plus a prescriptive force) might help. But again, it would be no help for understanding the 
related case of the mask, despite the fact that the value quality manifested there is exactly the 
same.
Expressive qualities are a subclass of value qualities that typically “present” the agents having 
them as other selves, namely, as subjects (or quasi-subjects) of emotion and action. It is by 
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means of these qualities that we usually take something to be another self. They present us 
with socially relevant properties of encountered agents and their actions.
But, when experienced in a purely aesthetical attitude, expressive qualities can be explored 
in a “detached” way, so that the pertinent emotions can be vividly felt without becoming 
reasons for action (think of thrillers, horror pictures, and so on). Aesthetic experience switches 
off action and at the same time deepens cognition. Figure 2 gives a further example, this 
time presenting a familiar scenario from ordinary life, of the “abstraction” involved in the 
appreciation of aesthetic value.
Figure 2
In comparison with the previous examples, the Halloween Pumpkin is a more “abstract” 
version of a ferocious expression. It is an almost simplified or schematic version of ferocity (an 
“eidos” of it?). You’ll notice nonetheless how well the salient features of apparent ferocity are 
preserved. In fact, a matter of real life and action has become pure play here with the help of 
this “aesthetic” object and our taking on the “right” attitude toward it. In aesthetic experience 
one apprehends the quality without being moved to action, thus taking it up in a dispassionate 
cognitive attitude. In pretense, as in some kinds of plays and games, the motivational power of 
qualities is in the “as if” mode, but you enact corresponding “as if” actions in relation to them.
Aesthetic experience switches off real action and switches on value cognition. This is 
especially true in the case of expressive qualities. A brief foray into the history of 20th century 
visual art will make the point clear.
In the Preface of an old English translation of Vassily Kandinsky’s Punkt und Linie zu Fläche 
(1926) we find a nice anecdote on the meaning of “abstract” painting: 
Upon his return to Munich, one evening there occurred at dusk the magical incident 
of his seeing merely the form and tone values in one of his paintings. While not 
recognizing its subject, he was not only struck by its increased beauty but also by the 
superfluity of the object in painting, in order to feel its spell. It took him fully two years 
to crystallize this miraculous discovery6.
6 Kandinsky (1926), p. 7. The date of this discovery is supposed to be about 1908. Even if Rebay does not report 
this detail, the tradition has it that the picture that struck Kandinsky in this way was not one of his own, but 
rather Monet’s Sheafs in the sun. The (1926) treatise was published sixteen years after his first one, Das Geistige in 
der Kunst (1910), and is based on Kandinsky’s teaching at the Bauhaus in Berlin (1921-24). It’s a nice coincidence 
that while the first treatise, written in Munich, is more or less contemporary with the flourishing of the Munich 
psychologist Theodor Lipps’ studies on empathy and aesthetics and the critical, very productive discussion of them 
within the Phenomenological Circle of Munich, animated by Scheler and attended by two of the most significant 
phenomenologists of aesthetics, Moritz Geiger and Dietrich von Hildebrand, the second one, crystallizing his teaching 
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The quotation conveys all that is needed to appreciate the series of visual experiments 
Kandinsky provides in the appendix of this remarkably valuable work. Let’s examine just two 
examples. So-called “abstract” painting only makes explicit – and does so in a programmatic 
way – what has always been true of painting, regardless of the views the painter or 
mainstream opinion about painting in different epochs. It highlights how visual art, correctly 
enjoyed, lets us see the how, and not only the what, of visible things. Generalized, we could 
say that aesthetic information is about the how and not the what, or that it’s about whatness, 
but only insofar as it can be made apparent independently of whether and where it exists, 
or whether it is really as it appears. Painting is about qualities, even those making up the 
solidity and three-dimensionality of the painting’s subject matter. It is about the gravity and 
seriousness of what is real, as is particularly evident in Cezanne’s use of the canvas. Qualities 
are the real “subject” of even the most figurative and “classic” painting. Geometry itself 
appears as the quality of an orderly world, an intelligible cosmos encompassing the City of 
Humans. That is true, for instance, of certain paintings by Piero della Francesca. 
Once you realize that the visual arts help to free visual perception from the practical tasks 
it serves in ordinary life and to free visual contents from their function of orienting you in 
reality, the supporting role of the “subject” (e.g., a depicted object) in such work is no longer 
necessary for appreciating the “how”, the pure visual content of possible perceptual worlds. 
Indeed, there is no need for a return to Platonism to understand Klee’s dictum that painting 
does not reproduce the visible, but makes even the “invisible” visible.
Klee’s dictum refers to what I’ve called value cognition. By “contemplating” visual art we come 
to “improve our understanding” (as per Murdoch) of expressive qualities. Actually, we come to 
improve our discriminative perception of them. More examples will prove helpful here. 
Figure 3. From V. Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane 7
years in Berlin, is more or less contemporary to the flourishing of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology in the 1920s 
and the beginning of the 1930s, before the Nazi catastrophe. 
7 Kandinsky (1926), Anhang (Appendix), Diagram 20, (1946) p. 152.
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Figure 4. From V. Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane 8
The “titles” given by Kandinsky to these drawing are respectively: “9 points in ascent 
(emphasis upon the diagonal d-a through weight)” (Figure 39); and “Diagonal tensions and 
counter-tensions with a point which brings an external construction to inner pulsation” 
(Figure 4) , The first is meant to illustrate the role of the point in visual form and the latter the 
role of the line.
Both configurations feature a striking dynamism, a quality we perceive or feel even if we know 
that the lines or the points on the paper are in fact motionless. Theodor Lipps (1906) describes 
this kind of quality as presenting “the life of lines”, as it were: 
[A] movement, such as stretching out, growing longer, self-restricting, abruptly starting 
and ending, or steady sliding, swinging up and down, bending, stooping, squeezing and 
expanding. All these predicates do not refer to geometrical features of the form, but 
denote activities…10.
We can call the qualities Lipps refers to as dynamic qualities. The drama of the lines and the 
rising of the points in Kandinsky may well be a good (almost) contemporary example of what 
Lipps has in mind11. 
8 Kandinsky (1926), Anhang (Appendix), Diagram 20, (1946) p. 186.
9 Kandinsky rejects customary distinctions of “the graphic” and “the pictorial”, according to which line is the essential 
element of graphics but is “in painting, contrary to its nature and, therefore, forbidden”. Here is his rationale: “This 
is a characteristic example of the existing confusion in concepts: that which can easily be segregated and placed in 
separate categories is mixed together (art, nature), and, on the other hand, the things that belong together (painting 
and graphics) are carefully separated from each other. The line is considered here to be a ‘graphic’ element and not to 
be used for ‘pictorial’ purposes, although an elementary difference between ‘graphics’ and ‘painting’ cannot be found 
and could never be established by the theorists mentioned”. Kandinsky (1946), p. 110.
10 Lipps, T. (1903-06), p. 184. Our translation.
11 Even if the theories of Point and Line to Plane (1926) emerge after Lipps’ Aesthetics, Kandinsky’s “first abstract 
watercolour” was painted about 1908, preceded by a rich series of works where the dedicated study of both expressive 
and dynamic qualities is more than evident. The same is true of other work done within the avant-garde art of the early 
20th century, and especially in Munich, where Kandinsky, with Franz Marc, Paul Jawlensky and others founded, as is 
well known, the Blaue Reiter movement (1911-14). 
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Instituting a pictorial space means literally “abstracting” these pervasive yet silent qualities 
from our concrete surrounding world in order to display them before our eyes, as objects 
whose variations and possibilities offer us a new, infinite domain of exploration12. This is, after 
all, what painters have always done. The frame of a painting manifests the initial “bracketing” 
the painter performs with respect to all the non-aesthetic goals of ordinary perception. It 
separates pictorial space from one’s surrounding actual space.
Yet it is only around the birth of “modern” art that this “bracketing” and this “abstraction”, 
achieved with the aid of aesthetic objects and their means (scores and melodies13, paper and 
drawings, collages, etc.), entered the laboratories of science and gave rise to experimental 
phenomenology14, including, very early on, Gestalt psychology.
What grounds abstract painting is indeed the very same discovery with which Gestalt 
psychology began. Both recognize that perceptual contents, far from being the unorganized 
“multiplicity” or “chaos” (Kant) of sense data postulated by the empiricist tradition, 
are organized by “configural” or structural properties. These properties are given, not 
“constructed”, and are non-conceptual, pre-linguistic, and often multi-modal or amodal in 
nature.
The fact that the two groups of researchers share a common root is something no author could 
better bear witness to than Rudolf Arnheim, the brightest pupil of Max Wertheimer. Arnheim 
was a brilliant young art critic in the roaring 1920s in Berlin, the director of the Italian Istituto 
del Cinema in the 1930s, and the founder of the psychology of visual art in his post-exile 
American academic life15. I quote him at length below not only because he and others of his 
school gave us a language for describing the axiological contents of aesthetical values, but 
also because there are passages in his work that bring the common root of Gestalt Psychology 
and abstract painting to the foreground. Take, for instance, this powerful synthesis of the 
“Kandinskian” analysis of dynamic qualities we’ve just reconstructed:
Visual experience is dynamic. This theme will recur throughout the present book. 
What a person or animal perceives is not only an arrangement of objects, of colors 
and shapes, of movements and sizes. It is, perhaps first of all, an interplay of directed 
tensions. These tensions are not something the observer adds, for reasons of his own, 
to static images. Rather, these tensions are as inherent in any percept as size, shape, 
location, or color. Because they have magnitude and direction, these tensions can be 
described as psychological ‘forces.’16
12 This point of course generalizes across the visual arts, and, mutatis mutandis, the institution of other aesthetical 
spaces, like that of music.
13 As is well known, the notion of “Gestalt” had been introduced into psychology by Christian von Ehrenfels in 1890 
in his essay “On Gestalt qualities”, where, observing that humans can recognize two melodies as identical even when 
no two corresponding notes in them have the same frequency, he argued that these forms must possess a “Gestalt 
quality”—a characteristic that is immediately given, over and above the single tones. Cf. von Ehrenfels C., Über 
“Gestaltqualitäten”. (1890), Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. 1890;14:224–292. (Translated as “On 
‘Gestalt qualities’”. In B. Smith (Ed. & Trans.), (1988), Foundations of Gestalt Theory (pp. 82–117). Munich, Germany/
Vienna, Austria: Philosophia Verlag.)
14 I use this expression, “experimental phenomenology,” to refer to that part of early experimental psychology that 
harboured and outlasted classical Gestalt psychology, on the one hand, and that instigated the powerful approach to 
generalization which led Husserl to the study of the eidetic universe. See De Monticelli (2018).
15 Rudolph Arnheim’s life (1904, Berlin – 2007, Ann Arbor, USA) actually spans the great temporal distance between 
the time of Stumpf, Husserl and Wertheimer and our own. See Arnheim (1954, 1974). The 1974 edition is a revised 
version of the original, published after 20 years of teaching in several New York Universities and Harvard University.
16 ibid., p. 11.
7. Abstract 





Perhaps no image could better illustrate the concept of visual force or tension at the heart 
of Kandinsky’s theory of elements (especially as it concerns point and plane) than the one 
reproduced in Figure 5. It exemplifies one of the phenomena to which Arnheim devoted most 
of his research, namely, the “power of centre.”
Figure 5. The Power of the centre
This figure – which is the first presented in his main work, occurring in the section titled 
“Balance”17 – illustrates the first principle of Gestalt theory. The fact that we perceive the 
slightly off-centre position of the “point” on the square plane is evidence for the principle that 
we grasp organized wholes. What we experience in perception is not the association of atomic 
perceptual data, but the immediate givenness of the elements appearing from the start as a 
function of the wholes to which they belong. 
Wagemans and colleagues put the point thus: “The contents of our awareness are by and large 
not additive but possess a characteristic coherence”18. There are several additional principles 
further articulating this notion of coherence that are also illustrated by this simple figure. 
Firstly, there is the principle of figure/ground, according to which the partial contents we 
perceive are experienced as segregated from a background. Secondly, there is the principle 
of unity, the basic organizing factor discussed by Kandinsky, which highlights structural 
features such as the square basic plane with its horizontal and vertical boundaries, its center, 
and its diagonals. Here the invisible center is manifested by the off-center point, and induces a 
dynamic quality within the figure, giving the impression of things being imbalanced.
I defer again to the expertise of Arnheim: 
The disk in Figure 5 is not simply displaced with regard to the center of the square. 
There is something restless about it. It looks as though it had been at the center and 
wished to return, or as though it wants to move away even farther. And the disk’s 
relations to the edges of the square are a similar play of attraction and repulsion19.
The “power of the center” in a sense “requires” the disk to be centred, that is, for the simple 
composition to reach balance. This is the first mention I’ve made so far of that feature of the 
perceived world that Wolfgang Koehler called “requiredness”, a type of “oughtness” which 
turns out to pervade the life world and also indicates for us the “place” that values have in it.
This simple example shows that it is not really a “subjective” – or rather, arbitrary – matter 
17 Ibid. p. 10.
18 Wagemans and colleagues, 2012: 1172–1217. Published online 2012 Jul 30. doi: 10.1037/a0029333, https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3482144/
19 Arnheim (1974), p. 12.
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to perceive what is required in a given context. Requiredness is not reducible to the allegedly 
prescriptive component of a thick value term (like imbalanced or disharmonious). There is of 
course nobody “requiring” the disk to be centred, any more than there is always someone 
commanding a warrior to be courageous or commandig someone giving an argument to 
ensure its validity. Nor are such thick value terms necessarily action guiding. They have plenty 
of descriptive content. But this content consists in qualities of requirednesses or – as it is 
referred to in experimental phenomenology – of “qualities of demand” (Albertazzi 2013). We 
literally perceive the demands that things manifest. 
Similarly, the apparent ascending movement we perceive in Kandinsky’s rising points in 
Figure 3 is also not “merely subjective”. If it is an illusion, it is not correctable, much like those 
so called “illusions” (such as the Muller-Lyer) that once led Gestalt psychologists to radically 
question the causal-physicalistic model of perception. The lightness of the “ascending points” 
is a material value quality, the global quality of a well-organized whole. 
Moore’s greatest intuition – that ideality is irreducible to reality – is tangled up with his worst 
mistake, which was to hold that Goodness or the Good is “a simple, non-analysable object 
of thought”20. Against Moore, we ought to hold instead that “Goodness” is a proxy word for 
“any positive value quality”. That is, it functions as a variable ranging over thick or material 
values. As an attributive adjective applicable to exemplars of various kinds of things (e.g., as 
with the phrase “a good knife”) it is a variable ranging over the positive value qualities of ideal 
exemplars of the relevant kind (e.g., functional value qualities, in the case of this domestic 
tool). As a moral predicate (“morally good”) it is a thick, –not thin, concept, ranging over all 
moral virtues and qualities of an intention, action, or person enabling them to realize the best 
value(s) possible in a given situation, which presupposes that we are capable of perceiving 
what is required in the first place, in short, that we are capable of attention. 
The upshot of this analysis is that, more generally, thin values depend on thick values, and 
it is false that thick values have no descriptive value content, i.e., that value qualities cannot 
be analysed, explained or described. They can, but only in terms of other values, contrary to 
Moore’s ineffability thesis.
Hare and Williams make the complementary mistake of reducing thick value terms to their 
alleged “real-descriptive” content plus a universal or indeterminate commendatory force. 
The No-Matter-of-Value thesis makes material axiology inconceivable.
But I hope to have shown not only that counterexamples to that thesis are conceivable, but also 
that we can see and feel what we conceive in them, thus making it possible for us to describe 
them more or less adequately and supply Material Axiology with its grounding evidence.
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